State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from September 20, 2012 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
9-20-2012 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from September 20, 2012 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from 
September 20, 2012 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/628 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6127 
TOWN OF CAIRO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, , 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and part-time EMTs, Intermediates and Drivers 
assigned to the-Town Ambulance Squad. 
Excluded: Ambulance Administrator and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: September 20, 2012 ' . 
Albany, New York 
fjMTtn^ 
Jerome Le/kowitzMZhairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHELDON LAMAR HUNT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-29667, U-29791, 
U-29831 U-29880 & U-30226 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. ' 
SHELDON LAMAR HUNT, pro se 
CHARLES D. MAURER, ESQ., for Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AN D COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KELLIE TERESE WALKER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Sheldon Lamar Hunt 
(Hunt) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing five improper 
practice charges, as amended, against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) for alleged violations of §209-a.2(c) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).1 The Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District) is a statutory party pursuant to 
§209-a.3oftheAct. 
The first four of Hunt's amended charges allege that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of 
the Act in its handling and treatment of various grievances. In Case No. U-29667, Hunt 
alleges that UFT breached its duty of fair representation when it failed to process his 
grievance challenging the District's use of a counseling memorandum in Education Law 
§3020-a disciplinary charges and the District's utilization of the memorandum in an 
unsatisfactory rating issued to him. In Case No. U-29791, Hunt alleges that UFT 
violated its duty of fair representation by failing to arbitrate a grievance challenging the 
District's placement of a letter in his personnel file alleging that he engaged in academic 
grade fraud. Similarly, in Case No. U-29831, Hunt alleges that UFT violated its duty to 
fairly'represent him with respect to a grievance challenging the District's placement of a 
letter in his personnel file alleging that he engaged in sexual misconduct toward a 
female student. In Case No. U-29880, Hunt alleges that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of 
the Act by failing to arbitrate a grievance challenging a District letter alleging 
insubordination, which was placed in his personnel file. 
Finally, Hunt alleges in Case No. U-30226 that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Act when the Office of General Counsel of the New York State United Teachers 
(NYSUT) withdrew as his legal representative in a pending Education Law §3020-a 
disciplinary proceeding. 
Following a consolidated hearing with respect to the charges, the ALJ issued a 
decision dismissing all five charges. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Hunt contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing his charges 
because her decision is inconsistent with the provisions of the District-UFT collective 
bargaining agreement (agreement) and Education Law §3020-a. UFT and the District 
support the ALJ's decision. 
Following our review of the record, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm 
the ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION 
The relevant facts concerning each of Hunt's charges are fully set forth in the 
ALJ's decision, and need not be repeated here. 
To demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation, a charging party must 
prove that an employee organization acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.2 Under the Act, an employee organization is afforded a 
broad range of reasonable discretion in determining which grievances to pursue and to 
what level of the negotiated grievance procedure.3 A mere, disagreement with the 
contract interpretation or tactics of an employee organization is insufficient to 
2
 Nassau Comm Coll Federation of Teachers, Local 3150 (Staskowski), 42 PERB 
113007(2009). 
3
 See, Rochester Teachers Assn (Falso), 45 PERB H3033 (2012); District Council 37 
'(Blowe and Watson), 42 PERB 1J3008 (2009); Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 
PERB 1J3003 (2008). See also, Symanski v East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist, 117 AD2d 18, 
19 PERB 1J7516 (2d Dept 1986). 
demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation.4 We will not substitute our 
judgment concerning the merits of a grievance for an employee organization's 
reasonable interpretation of its negotiated agreement with the employer.5 Finally, an 
employee organization is not obligated to pursue a claim it believes, in good faith, to 
lack merit.6 
In the present case, Hunt's exceptions fail to set forth any bases for disturbing . 
the ALJ's conclusions that UFT did not breach its duty of fair representation as alleged 
in the five amended charges. 
The record fully supports the ALJ's conclusions in Case Nos. U-29667, U-29791 
and U-29880, that UFT reached good faith conclusions that the grievances lacked 
sufficient merit to warrant further processing, it communicated its analyses to Hunt and 
advised him that he could pursue remedial relief in the context of an Education Law 
§3020-a hearing. Hunt's continued disagreement with UFT's conclusions, analyses and 
advice regarding the three grievances do not demonstrate a violation of §20.9-a.2(c) of 
the Act. 
In Case No. U-29831, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that it is 
facially deficient because it fails to allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would 
demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation. Hunt has not filed an exception 
4
 Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB 1J3027 (2010); TWU 
(Brockington), 37 PERB H3002 (2004). 
5
 UFT (Morrell), 44 PERB 1J3030 (2011). 
6
 Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Gardner), 31 PERB 
to that portion of the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge; therefore that issue is 
waived by Hunt.7 Instead, Hunt challenges the ALJ's rejection of his post-hearing 
claim, which is not pled in his charge, that UFT violated its duty by failing to process the 
grievance to arbitration. The record, however, reveals that Hunt's argument is 
premised solely on his disagreement with UFT's reasonable interpretation of the 
agreement, which was communicated to him by a UFT representative. Therefore, the 
ALJ properly rejected Hunt's post-hearing argument. 
Finally, we consider Hunt's exceptions in Case No. U-30226, which alleges UFT 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act when NYSUT withdrew legal representation in a pending 
Education Law §3020-a disciplinary hearing. In his exceptions, Hunt does not 
challenge the ALJ's conclusion that the withdrawal was precipitated by Hunt's 
insistence that the NYSUT attorney comply with the following contradictory instructions: 
a) plead "no contest" to the disciplinary charges; b) object to proposed District 
amendments to the charges; and c) pursue a defense at the disciplinary hearing 
predicated on the anti-discrimination provision in the Uniformed Service Employment 
and Reemployment Rights Act of 19948 (USERRA). ' • 
The record reveals that the withdrawal of representation took place only after 
Hunt rejected legal advice from the NYSUT attorney, who explained that the proposed 
strategy to plead "no contest" to the substance of the disciplinary charges would result 
7Section 213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure; Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 
(2007), confirmed, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 
lf7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). 
o 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SPRINGS 
SCHOOL UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-30168 
- and -
SPRINGS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL 
(PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P (NEIL M. BLOCK of counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT T. REILLY, 
ESQ and LAURA R. HALLAR, ESQ, of counsel), for Amicus Curiae New 
York State United Teachers 
JAY WORONA, ESQ., and AILEEN ABRAMS, ESQ., for Amicus Curiae New 
York State School Boards Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a charge alleging that the Springs Union 
Free School District (District) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally transferring certain duties in the prekindergarten 
program exclusively performed by CSEA unit employees to a private contractor, and by 
unilaterally ending a past practice of permitting unit employees, who do not attend an 
without utilizing leave accruals.1 
CSEA seeks reversal of the ALJ's decision finding that the reassignment of 
prekindergarten program duties of teaching assistants to nonunit employees is 
nonmandatory pursuant to Education Law §3602-e. Secondly, CSEA challenges the 
ALJ's sustainment of the District's contract reversion defense concerning the 
discontinuance of the past practice permitting unit employees to leave work early if they 
do not attend the annual staff luncheon. The District supports the ALJ's decision. 
The New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and the New York State School 
Boards Association (NYSSBA) have each filed an amicus curiae brief limited to the first 
issue raised in CSEA's exceptions. NYSUT contends that Education Law §3602-e does 
not render the at-issue subject nonmandatory under the Act, while NYSSBA supports 
the ALJ's finding that the Legislature intended to remove the decision to reassign 
prekindergarten program work from the subjects that are mandatorily negotiable under 
the Act. 
FACTS 
The following facts are based on the parties' stipulation of facts and 
accompanying exhibits. By stipulating to the facts and exhibits, the parties have aided 
in the expedited processing of the charge. 
CSEA represents a unit of District employees, including those employed in the 
title of teacher assistant. Article V(A) of the parties' expired July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) states: 
shall be determined by the days in the Springs Teachers 
Association calendar. The workday shall be 8:20 AM to 3:10 
PM with thirty (30) minutes for lunch. For those working the 
early morning schedule, the workday shall be 7:30 a.m. to 
2:20 p.m. Employees shall be entitled to two (2) fifteen 
minute breaks each work day and thirty (30) minutes for 
lunch with the exception of the school nurse who shall have 
a forty-five (45) minute lunch break. The scheduling of the 
breaks shall be at the discretion of the Superintendent. 
Article VI of the agreement sets forth the applicable provisions for excused absences 
including sick leave, personal leave, bereavement leave, and child care leave. 
For at least five consecutive years prior to 2010, CSEA unit employees have 
been invited to attend an annual staff luncheon on the last day of school, which is 
organized by another employee organization representing other District employees. 
The District released any CSEA unit employee who chose not to attend the luncheon at 
10:30 am, and paid that employee for the full workday without the employee charging 
leave accruals. 
In a memorandum dated May 3, 2010, the District notified all staff that if an 
employee did not attend the annual luncheon on June 25, 2010, the last day of the 
school year, she or he was obligated to remain on-duty until dismissal. It is undisputed 
that the District did not negotiate with CSEA regarding the elimination of the practice of 
early release time for CSEA-represented employees who did not attend the luncheon. 
Starting with the 2003-04 school year, the District has offered a prekindergarten 
program. Teaching assistant duties in that program were performed exclusively by . 
CSEA unit employees until the end of the 2009-10 school year. 
The New York State Education Department (SED) issues grants to school 
districts for the operation of prekindergarten programs as long as all four-year old 
Education Law §3602-e. Such programs are known as "universal prekindergarten 
programs." 
For the 2007-08 through 2010-11 school years, the District received approval 
and grant funding from SED to operate a universal prekindergarten program as defined 
in Education Law §3602-e. The District's purpose in applying for and receiving SED 
grant funding for the universal prekindergarten program was to decrease its own costs 
and accept all eligible applicants. The District continues to receive SED funding, which 
it uses to partially fund the universal prekindergarten program. 
For the 2010-11 school year, the District issued a request for proposals for 
eligible agencies to operate its universal prekindergarten program. SCOPE Educational 
r' 
Services (SCOPE), a not-for-profit private organization permanently chartered by the 
New York State Board of Regents (Board of Regents) to provide services to school 
districts, including early childhood programs, filed a proposal with the District dated 
February 25, 2010, along with a proposed agreement to provide a universal 
prekindergarten program in the 2010-11 school year. The District accepted SCOPE'S. 
proposal and entered into an agreement with SCOPE dated July 30, 2010, for SCOPE 
to operate the District's universal prekindergarten program in the 2010-11 school year. 
SCOPE began staffing the District's universal prekindergarten program in the 
2010-11 school year with four SCOPE employees, including two teaching assistants 
who are not in the CSEA-represented unit. The duties of SCOPE teaching assistants in 
the morning and afternoon sessions are similar to those previously performed by CSEA-
represented teaching assistants in the District-operated prekindergarten program. 
SCOPE employees without negotiations with CSEA. • 
DISCUSSION 
In order for another state law to overcome New York's strong and sweeping 
public policy under the Act mandating negotiations between employers and employee 
organizations over terms and conditions of employment in the public sector, the statute 
must plainly and clearly manifest a legislative intent for the at-issue subject to be 
nonmandatory. The Legislature's intent may be explicit or it may.be implied from the 
particular wording utilized in the statute.2 
Once the Legislature has established "the public policy choices for the State, it is 
not within the authority of PERB or the courts to interfere with or reject those choices."3 
We recognize, however, that our statutory interpretation is subject to different degrees 
of deference by the courts, depending upon whether it involves an interpretation of a 
statutory term of art under the Act and related labor relations provisions codified in other 
statutes, or involves discerning legislative intent.4 
2
 See, Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 619, 23 
PERB 1J7013 (1990); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York v New 
York Pub Empl Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 117012 (1990); State of New York-
Unified Court System, 28 PERB P044 (1995j. . 
3
 Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, 44 PERB 1J3001 at 
3009 (2011), confirmed in part sub nom, Buffalo United Charter Sch, Brooklyn Excelsior 
Charter Sch and National Heritage Academies, Inc v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
_M isc3d_ , 45 PERB TJ7005 (Sup Ct Erie County 2012). 
4
 Town of Wallkill, 42 PERB 1J3017 (2009), pet dismissed, Town of Wallkill v New York 
State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 43 PERB ^|7005 (Sup Ct Albany County 2010)(appeal 
pending); KIPP Academy Charter Sch (Corcoran), 45 PERB P013 (2012); Webster 
Cent Sch Dist v. New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 2. 
Education Law §3602-e demonstrate a clear legislative intent to supersede the Act by 
making the transfer of teaching assistant duties in a universal prekindergarten program 
created under that statute a nonmandatory subject. While the Legislature did not 
directly address negotiability under the Act in Education Law §3602-e, and the 
legislative history provides no guidance, we conclude that the structure, wording and 
purpose of Education Law §3602-e demonstrate a clear and plain legislative intent to 
permit districts, without mandatory negotiations, to subcontract with a collaborating 
"eligible agency" for teaching assistant duties. The district's action, however, must be 
consistent with the adopted prekindergarten program plan, following SED's approval of 
the grant application and the completion of the mandatory competitive bidding process 
under Education Law §3602-e. ' 
In reaching this legal conclusion, we emphasize the narrowness of our decision 
and its limited precedential value for future cases because it is based upon the statutory 
scheme, unique wording and purpose of Education Law §3602-e. 
Education Law §3602-e permits a district to apply to SED on an annual basis for 
a state grant to establish and implement a universal prekindergarten program. The 
application must be in the form prescribed by the SED Commissioner and consistent 
with the rules and regulations promulgated by SED and the Board of Regents.5 
The application must also be consistent with the prekindergarten program plan 
adopted by the district's board of education.6 Education Law §3602-e.1 (d) defines a 
5
 Educ Law §3602-e.5; 8 NYCRR §151-1.5. 
effectively serve eligible children directly through the school district or through 
collaborative efforts between the school district and an eligible agency or agencies." 
(Emphasis added) 
The phrase "eligible agencies" is defined by Education Law §3602-e.1 (b) as: 
a provider of child care and early education, a day care 
provider, early childhood program or center, or community-
based organization, including but not limited to approved 
pre-school special education programs, head start, and 
nursery schools so long as the standards and qualifications 
set forth pursuant to subdivision twelve of this section have 
been met. 
The codified definitions set forth in Education Law §§3602-e.1 (d) and 3602-e.1 (b) 
demonstrate an explicit intent for districts to be able to collaborate and contract with 
private sector early childcare providers in designing and implementing universal 
prekindergarten plans. 
Education Law §§3602-e.5(a)-(c) expressly authorize a district to coordinate 
proposals for prekindergarten program services with an eligible agency or agencies 
through competitive bidding.7 Education Law §3602-e.5(a) states: 
If the school district chooses to coordinate proposals for pre-
kindergarten program services, it shall conduct a competitive 
process in accordance with the procedures set forth b the 
commissioner and with the requirements and regulations set 
forth by the commissioner and with the requirements and 
regulations set forth in, and pursuant to, subdivisions seven, 
eight and twelve of this section. (Emphasis added) 
7
 See, 8 NYCRR §151-1.6 (describing the applicable competitive procedure to be 
followed when a district designs a collaborative prekindergarten program with an eligible 
agency). 
proposals are the staffing patterns and qualifications of an eligible agency. . 
While Education Law §3602-e.5(a) suggests that a district's decision to 
collaborate with an eligible agency is discretionary, Education Law §3602-e.5(e) 
includes a material incentive devised by the Legislature to encourage collaboration with 
eligible agencies. Education Law §3602-e.5(e) mandates that at least ten percent of a 
grant awarded to a district must be "set aside for collaborative efforts with eligible 
agencies" unless the SED Commissioner issues a waiver "based upon documented 
evidence that the school district was unable to use the set aside to make a collaborative 
arrangement that would meet all requirements of this subdivision because of 
unavailability of eligible agencies willing to collaborate or other factors beyond the 
control of the school district...." 
Education Law §3602-e. 12 requires that in developing regulations, the Board of 
Regents "shall consider and recognize the diversity of settings and models available for 
the delivery of prekindergarten programs operated by eligible agencies in alternative 
settings, including libraries and community based organizations, that comply with this 
section." Education Law §3602-e. 12(a) requires that those regulations include: 
minimum qualifications for personnel providing instructional 
and other services in prekindergarten programs. In . 
promulgating such regulations, the commissioner and board 
of regents shall take into account the availability of certified 
teachers and teaching assistants to provide instruction in 
prekindergarten programs and shall consider ways to 
increase the pool of qualified personnel. 
8 NYCRR §151-1.6(c)(4). 
maintain on file with SED a description of the district's competitive process for selecting 
an eligible agency, a copy of any contracts or agreements with an eligible agency for 
implementation of a universal prekindergarten program and a list of such agencies with 
information concerning each site.9 
Following completion of the statutorily mandated competitive process, Education 
Law §3602-e.5(d) authorizes a district to enter into a contract with an eligible agency to 
implement its prekindergarten plan. Education Law §3602-e.5(d) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the school 
districts shall be authorized to enter any contractual or other 
arrangements necessary to implement the district's 
prekindergarten plan. 
In its totality, Education Law §3602-e constitutes a legislative scheme to 
encourage districts to offer universal prekindergarten programs that maximize student 
participation and minimize district costs in providing such services through annual 
grants of state aid and entering into "any contractual or other arrangements" with 
eligible agencies. The decision to offer a prekindergarten program, however, remains at 
the discretion of a board of education.10 To effectuate the educational policy of 
encouraging the creation and implementation of universal prekindergarten programs, 
the Legislature included provisions in Education Law §3602-e to promote collaborative 
relationships between districts and eligible entities in the design and implementation of 
such program services. 
9
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit B, 2009-2010 Application, p. 7; 2010-2011 Application, p. 
4. 
10
 See, Educ Law §1712. 
entity to perform program services connected with the district's prekindergarten program 
plan and its grant application to SED. Following the competitive process, Education 
Law §3602-e.5(d) authorizes districts "to enter any contractual or other arrangements 
necessary to implement the district's prekindergarten plan." (emphasis added) We find 
that the broad and explicit language of Education Law §3602-e.5(d) demonstrates a 
clear intent to grant districts the right to contract with eligible agencies for any necessary 
services for implementation of its prekindergarten plan "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" including the Act.11 
The broad wording of the subsection undermines the narrow construction urged 
by CSEA and NYSUT. The fact that the Legislature utilized the term "authorize" in the 
subsection does not demonstrate that it was intended to only supersede precedent 
prohibiting school districts from contracting with private vendors for instructional 
services.12 If the purpose of the subsection was so limited, the Legislature would not 
have enacted a provision that on its face states that it is aimed at superseding "any 
other provision of law" and permits districts to enter into "any contractual or other 
arrangements" to implement prekindergarten program plans. 
11
 See, Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, supra, note 3 
(where we held that the wording of Educ Law §2854.1 (a) demonstrated a legislative 
intent that provisions of the Charter Schools Act of 1998 supersede all. other 
inconsistent provisions of New York law including the joint employer doctrine under the 
Act.). 
12
 See, Appeal ofMcKenna, 42 Ed Dept Rep Decision No 14,774 (2002); Appeal of 
Woodarek, 46 Ed Dept Rep Decision No 15,422 (2006). 
decision in Webster Central School District v New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board (hereinafter Webster),™ and our decision in State of New York-Unified 
Court System (UCS),U are distinguishable based upon differences between the laws 
analyzed in those cases, and the provisions in Education Law §3602-e. In Webster, the 
Court held that a 1984 amendment to Education Law §1950 demonstrated a legislative 
intent to make a school district decision to transfer certain unit work to be nonmandatory 
because the statutory scheme included job protection provisions for adversely impacted 
teachers. In UCS, we found that the legislative history and judicial interpretation of a 
statute allowing for the cost-reducing introduction of mechanical recording equipment 
within the court system to replace the taking of stenographic minutes demonstrated a 
legislative intent to remove the subject from mandatory negotiations. While Education 
Law §3602-e lacks a job protection provision analogous to the one in Webster, and a 
legislative history equivalent to that found in UCS, we find those differences to be 
immaterial to our conclusion based upon the statutory scheme, wording and purpose of 
Education Law §3602-e. In fact, Education Law §3602-e seeks to reduce the costs for 
districts to provide prekindergarten program services and encourage districts to 
collaborate with eligible entities that have sufficient staffing patterns and qualifications. 
Finally, the District's prior decision to have CSEA unit employees perform 
teaching assistant duties in its universal prekindergarten program is not relevant 
because Education Law §3602-e grants the District the discretion to reassign the work 
13
 Supra, note 2. 
takes place following SED's approval of the grant application and completion of the 
mandatory competitive bidding process. 
Next, we turn to CSEA's exceptions seeking reversal of that portion of the ALJ's 
decision that dismissed its charge alleging a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act when the 
District unilaterally discontinued a past practice permitting CSEA unit employees to 
leave work early if they do not attend the annual staff luncheon. 
When "parties have reached an agreement with respect to a specific subject 
following negotiations, a party may unilaterally end a past practice without violating the 
Act by reverting to the terms of a specifically negotiated provision of the agreement."15 
The burden, however, rests with the respondent to prove a contract reversion defense 
through negotiated terms that are reasonably clear on the specific subject at issue.16 If 
an "agreement is reasonably clear but susceptible to more than one interpretation, 
extrinsic evidence, such as negotiation history and/or a past practice, is admissible to 
determine the intent of the parties."17 v 
In the present case, Article V(A) of the parties' agreement is reasonably clear 
and it is not susceptible to alternative interpretations regarding work hours and breaks 
for CSEA unit employees. This interpretation is confirmed when Article V(A) is read in 
conjunction with Article VI of the agreement. Therefore, we find that the District had the 
15
 City of Albany, 41 PERB 1J3019 at 3090' (2008); New York City Transit Auth, 41 PERB 
1J30.14 (2008); Village of Mt Kisco, 43 PERB 1J3029 (2010). 
16
 Village ofMt Kisco, supra, note 15;. New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB P037 
(1987), confirmed, NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 
PERB Tf7001 (2d Dept 1989); Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB fl3042 (1999). 
employees leaving work early on the last day school without charging their accruals if 
they chose not to attend the staff luncheon.18 
Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 20, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, WESTCHESTER 
LOCAL 860, YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NON-TEACHING UNIT 9169, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CASE NO. U-30302 
YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL 
(LESLIE C. PERRIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER AND DROHAN, LLP (LAWRENCE W. 
THOMAS and ANA I. GONZALEZ of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Yonkers City School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the 
-District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally discontinued-a past practice of providing fully-paid health insurance upon 
retirement to employees in a unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester Local 860, Yonkers City 
School District Non-Teaching Unit 9169 (CSEA).1 
The District seeks reversal of the ALJ's decision and dismissal of the charge on 
various grounds including: a) the District has a unilateral right to alter a past practice 
1 A A n r n o rr>i£>no /oo<i A \ 
concerning the level of health benefits it provides to retired former employees; b) the 
terms of the 2007-2011 District-CSEA collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) 
extinguished any reasonable expectation of CSEA unit members that the District's three 
decade-old past practice of providing fully paid health insurance upon their retirement 
would continue; c) the subject matter of the charge is prohibited pursuant to §201.4 of 
the Act; d) the ALJ erred in failing to distinguish the decision in Lynbrook Police 
Benevolent Association2 (hereinafter Lynbrook); and e) the subject of the charge is 
nonmandatory pursuant to a state law limiting the prerogative of a school district to 
unilaterally diminish health insurance benefits or contributions of retired employees. In 
addition, it challenges the ALJ's proposed remedial order. CSEA supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The record is comprised of testimony from 
two CSEA witnesses and a copy of the District-CSEA agreement. 
Prior to July 1, 2010, the District had a three decade-old past practice of 
providing fully-paid health insurance to CSEA unit members upon their retirement. The 
practice was known to CSEA and unit members. The current and prior agreements 
between the parties are silent concerning retiree health insurance. Section 9.1 of the 
parties' agreement states that, effective "July 1, 2010, all employees will make 
210 PERB 1J3067 (1977), reversed in part sub nom. Inc Vill of Lynbrook v New York 
State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 64 AD2d 902, 11 PERB 1J7012 (2nd Dept 1978), reinstated, 48 
NY2d 398, 12 PERB H7021 (1979). 
contributions to their health insurance premiums through regular payroll deductions...," 
On or about July 1, 2010, the District notified CSEA unit employees that upon their 
retirement they would be required to make the same health insurance premium 
contributions that active employees have to make under the agreement. Thereafter, the 
District implemented its policy and required unit employees who retired after July 1, 
2010 to make the same contributions applicable to active unit employees pursuant to 
the agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the Act, a demand for health insurance benefits for former employees who 
have already retired is nonmandatory.3 In contrast, the subject of health insurance 
benefits for current employees upon their retirement constitutes a form of deferred 
compensation and is mandatorily negotiable.4 Therefore, a unilateral change of an 
enforceable past practice concerning health care benefits for current employees upon 
3
 See, e.g., Lynbrook PBA, supra, note 2; Troy Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Local 2304, 
IAFF, 10 PERB 1J3015 (1977). An exception to this general rule, however, may result if 
the supplemental theory of negotiability, which converts nonmandatory subjects in an 
agreement into mandatory subjects, is applicable. See, City of New York, 40 PERB 
|f3017 (2007); City of Cohoes, 31 PERB 1J3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom, Uniform 
Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 
1999), affd, 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied 96 NY2d 711, 34 
PERB 1J7018 (2001). 
4
 Cohoes Police Benevolent and Protective Assn, 27 PERB fl3058 (1994); Bridge and 
Tunnel Officers Benevolent Assn, 29 PERB 1J3012 (1996); Town of Shawangunk, 32 
PERB 1J3042 (1999). See also, Aeneas McDonald PBA v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, 
31 PERB H7503(1998). 
their retirement violates §209-a. 1(d) of the Act.5 
The at-issue subject in the present case is fully paid health insurance for current 
CSEA unit employees upon their retirement.. The subject is not, as argued by the 
District, health insurance contributions for retirees. As a result, we reject the District's 
claim that it had a right to unilaterally change the past practice of providing fully paid 
health insurance to current unit employees upon their retirement. 
Contrary to the District's contention, §9.1 of the parties's agreement does not 
constitute a basis for reversing the ALJ's finding that CSEA and the unit employees had 
a reasonable expectation that the past practice would continue. As we recognized in 
Town of Shawangunk,6 there is substantive difference between a contract clause for 
health benefits while employed, and a provision for benefits upon retirement: 
The health insurance benefits to be extended to employees 
while they are employed are a form of current wages for 
services then being rendered by them. The health insurance 
benefits extended to an individual upon that individual's 
retirement from employment are a form of deferred 
compensation representing a payment in the future for the 
services a former employee has rendered in the past. The 
parties' agreement to a form of current compensation for 
active employees does not represent an agreement to any 
form of deferred compensation for former employees, 
including health insurance continuation after retirement. An 
agreement to the former simply does not satisfy any duty to 
negotiate as to the latter because the subjects of current and 
deferred compensation are fundamentally different.7 
5
 See, County of St. Lawrence, 44 PERB TJ4518 (2011), affd, 45 PERB P 0 0 1 . 
(2012)(appeal pending); Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB 1J3012 (2007), on 
remand, 42 PERB 1J4527 (2009), affd, 43 PERB 1J3017 (2010), confirmed sub nom 
Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New York State Public EmpI Rel Bd; 95 AD3d 1479, 
45 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 2012) (appeal pending). 
6
 32 PERB 113042(1999). 
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Section 9.1 of the agreement requires health insurance premium contributions by 
current employees through regular payroll deductions while they are employed by the 
District. The provision is silent with respect to the level of benefits for current unit 
employees upon their retirement, and it is not disputed that that distinct subject has 
never been the topic of negotiations between the parties. Therefore, §9.1 of the 
agreement cannot reasonably be construed as extinguishing the reasonable 
expectation that the District's past practice of providing fully paid health insurance upon 
retirement would continue. 
Furthermore, the mere fact unit employees received notification on or about July 
1, 2010 that the District would require them to make contributions for health insurance 
when they retire did not eliminate, as a matter of law under the Act, the reasonable 
expectation of CSEA unit employees. Indeed, it was the District's notification to unit 
employees that precipitated the filing of CSEA's charge. 
We next turn to the District's assertions that the subject of the charge is 
prohibited under §201.4 of the Act, and that the decision in Lynbrool^ is distinguishable 
from the present case. Section 201.4 of the Act states: 
The term "terms and conditions of employment" means 
salaries, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment provided, however, that such term shall not 
include any benefits provided by or to be provided by a 
public retirement system, or payments to a fund or insurer to 
provide an income for retirees, or payment to retirees or their 
beneficiaries. No such retirement benefits shall be 
negotiated pursuant to this article, and any benefits so 
negotiated shall be void. 
Supra, note 2. 
In Lynbrook, the Court of Appeals affirmed our statutory interpretation that 
"hospitalization insurance benefits for families of current employees who die after 
retirement are not prohibited subjects of collective bargaining in the public sector" under 
§201.4 of the Act.9 Like the proposal in Lynbrook, which sought a form of deferred 
compensation payable upon retirement and was unrelated to benefits provided by a 
retirement system, the subject of CSEA's charge is not a prohibited subject. 
We also find meritless, the District's reliance on the state law enacted in 1994,10 
and made permanent in 2009,11 limiting the discretion of a school district to diminish the 
health insurance benefits of retirees . The statute states: 
From on and after June 30, 1994 a school district, board of 
cooperative educational services, vocational education and 
extension board or a school district as enumerated in 
section 1 of chapter 566 of the laws of 1967, as 
amended, shall be prohibited from diminishing the health 
insurance benefits provided to retirees and their 
dependents or the contributions such board or district 
makes for such health insurance coverage below the level 
of such benefits or contributions made on behalf of such 
retirees and their dependents by such district or board 
unless a corresponding diminution of benefits or 
contributions is effected from the present level during this 
period by such district or board from the corresponding 
group of active employees for such retirees.12 
By its express terms, "the statute protects retirees from a diminution of health insurance 
benefits in the absence of a corresponding diminution exacted from active 
9
 Supra, note 2, 48 NY2d at 402, 12 PERB at 7040. See also, Chenango Forks Cent 
Sch Dist, supra, note 5; Cohoes Police Benevolent and Protective Assn, supra, note 4. 
10
 L 1994, c 729. 
11
 L 2009, c504, Part B, §14. 
employees."13 The statute does not have any impact on the negotiability under the Act 
of deferred compensation in the form health insurance benefits for current unit 
employees upon their retirement. 
Finally, we deny the District's exception challenging the proposed remedial order 
in the ALJ's decision. Notably, the District does not articulate any specific failings 
concerning the terms of the proposed make-whole remedial order. As we have stated 
previously, the purpose of our remedial orders "is to make parties whole for the wrong 
sustained by placing them as nearly as possible in the position they would have been in 
had the improper practice not been committed."14 The remedial order in the present 
case satisfies that purpose. . 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the directive that unit employees who retire on or after July 1, 2010 
will be required to pay health insurance contributions during retirement; 
2. Not unilaterally change the past practice of paying current unit employees 
100 percent of the cost of health insurance premiums upon retirement; 
13
 Bryant v Board ofEduc, Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 21 AD3d 1134, 1136 (3d 
Dept 2005) (subsequent history omitted). 
14
 Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066 at 3139 (1992). See also, 
City of Oneonta, 43 PERB P006 (2010); State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services), 43 PERB 1J3039 (2010). 
3. Make whole any CSEA unit employees who retired on or after July 1, 2010, 
and who were required to contribute towards the cost of health insurance 
premiums during retirement, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
normally used for communication with unit employees. 
DATED: September 20, 2012 
Albany, New York 
\^L^JU 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees of the Yonkers City School District (District) in the unit 
represented by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, Westchester Local 860, Yonkers City School District Non-Teaching Unit 9169 
(CSEA) that the District will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the directive that CSEA unit employees who retire on or after July 1, 
2010 will be required to pay health insurance contributions during retirement; . 
2. Not unilaterally change the past practice of paying current CSEA unit employees 
100 percent of the cost of health insurance premiums upon retirement; 
3. Make whole any CSEA unit employees who retired on or after July 1, 2010, and 
who were required to contribute towards the cost of health insurance premiums 
during retirement, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . . . . 
on behalf of the YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29442 
- and -
VILLAGE OF BATH, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, CO-COUNSEL 
(PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH PLLC (EDWARD A. TREVITT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Village of Bath 
(Village) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1 finding that the Village 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
refused to execute a collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) for the period June 
1, 2009-May 31, 2013, which incorporated terms of a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) between the Village and the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). The Village also excepts to the ALJ's conclusion 
that it violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act through its direct dealing with CSEA-
represented unit members by requiring them to sign and return statements concerning 
their respective wages. Finally, the Village excepts to the ALJ's finding that the 
village s conauci so tainted ine village ooaru s reserved ngnt to rainy tne collective 
bargaining agreement (agreement) to constitute a waiver of any further right to ratify the 
agreement 
Following our consideration of the parties' arguments, and the record before us, 
we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The Village and CSEA are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement), which expired on May 31, 2009. That agreement, which originally covered 
the period June 1, 2004-May 31, 2008, was later extended an additional year by the 
parties. The expired agreement included provisions relating to grades, starting salaries, 
increments, longevity payments and lump-sum payments in the first year of the 
agreement. Article VI(A) and Schedule A included the starting salaries for all unit 
positions and five annual step increments for each position. Step increments under the 
expired agreement were not, however, automatic. Article XII(A) stated that increments 
would be granted only after the department supervisor or head has certified that the 
employee "has demonstrated adaptability and proficiency in the work warranting the 
wages scheduled." ~ 
Pursuant to Article VI(B) of the original agreement, a unit employee was entitled 
to a one-time off step payment of $500 after she or he reached the maximum step. 
Article VI(C) of that agreement provided for a retroactive $1000 lump sum payment for 
June 1, 2004-May 31, 2005, half of which was added to each employee's base salary. 
The expired agreement also provided a 3% annual wage increase in each of the four 
years. 
agreement, uuuny me neyuiiauuns, ine vmaye was lepie&emeu uy vmaye iviayui anu 
former Village Attorney David G. Wallace (Wallace) and CSEA was represented by 
Labor Relations Specialist Kelly Comfort (Comfort). There were approximately six 
bargaining sessions between the parties. CSEA presented written proposals during the 
negotiations; the Village did not. 
At the first session on February 25, 2009, CSEA presented proposals calling for 
4% annual wage increases for each year ending May 31, 2012, increases in the 
amounts of specific longevity payments, and deletion of existing contractual language in 
Article VI concerning lump sum payments. Although CSEA's proposals sought deletion 
of contractual language in Articles VI and XII with respect to increments, the proposals 
stated that the parties "need to look at reinstating the steps." 
During the February 25, 2009 bargaining session, the parties discussed the 
Village's stated need to increase the starting salaries for apprentice linemen and line 
workers to aid in the retention of employees in those titles. Village Mayor Wallace 
testified that employees in line worker titles had recently left Village employment to 
accept private sector jobs due to the Village's salary structure. CSEA took the position, 
however, that there should be increases in the starting salaries for all unit positions, 
which was agreed to by the Village. The parties also discussed raising current 
employees' salaries in each title to ensure that such salaries were not below the 
increased starting salaries for newly hired employees. 
In a second set of proposals, dated March 31, 2009, CSEA sought increasesin 
starting salaries for all unit employees, and upgrades for the positions.of apprentice line 
worker and meter reader. The proposed increases and upgrades were prefaced with 
oiarung salaries neeu 10 oe aaaresseu, noi jusi uy me 
current grade system, but by individual titles. The following 
are but a few of the examples that CSEA feels need to be 
addressed: Please keep in mind, that if a starting salary 
increases, current employees who are already in that 
position shall have their salaries increase accordingly so that 
new employees are not making more than they are. 
During his testimony, Mayor Wallace admitted that he agreed with CSEA's 
proposition that the salary of a current employee should not be below the starting salary 
of a new employee in the same title. 
Under CSEA's proposal, an apprentice line worker would have been upgraded to 
Grade 8 with the starting salary increased from $24,227 to $36,000. In addition, the 
starting salary for an electric line worker would increase from $38,173 to $43,000. The 
account clerk's starting salary would rise from $26,700 to $30,000. 
On April 29, 2009, CSEA proposed that all unit members receive 3.5% annual 
increases for each year of a new three-year agreement ending May 31, 2012. This 
proposal did not include proposed lump sum payments or step increments. It did 
acknowledge, however, that CSEA's proposal for increases in starting salaries 
remained unresolved. CSEA representative Comfort testified that during this bargaining 
session the parties did not discuss unit members receiving annual salary increases in 
addition to the proposed annual 3.5% annual increases. 
At a bargaining session on May 29, 2009, CSEA presented new proposals for a 
four-year agreement. At that session, CSEA proposed an annual percentage increase 
of 3.5% in the first year, 4.0% in the three succeeding years, and graduated increases 
in employee health care contributions over the four-year term of the agreement. CSEA 
also proposed specific lump sum increases in the starting salary for each unit position, 
panicuiar increase wouia oe impiemeniea. i ne iviay zy, zuuy proposals siaiea: 
CSEA's proposals on salary, starting salaries and health insurance contributions 
1. Year One 
Salary increase: 3.5% 
Health Insurance Contribution: 1% 
Starting Salary by Title lncreases:Account Clerk (1) $2,000 
Apprentice Lineworker (2) $6,000 
Asst Overhead Line Supv (1) $6,000 
Lineworker (2) $5,000 
2. Year Two 
Salary increase: 4.0% 
Health Insurance Contribution: 2.0% 
Starting Salary by Title Increases: Utility Svc Worker (3) $2,000 
Maintenance Person (5) $2,000 
Asst. Utility Maint Supv (1) $6,000 
Automative Mechanic (1) $2,000 
3. Year Three 
Salary increase: 4.0% 
Health Insurance Contribution: 3.0% 
Starting Salary by Title Increases: Meter Reader (2) $2,000 
Service Desk Operator (3) $2,000 
Consumer Srv Clerk (3) $2,000 
Asst. Utility Svc Supv (1) $6,000 
Senior Clerk (1) $2,000 
4. Year Four 
Salary increase: 4.0% 
Health Insurance Contribution: 4.0% 
Starting Salary by Title Increases: Clerk (0) $2,000 
v
 Laborer (0) $2,000 
WWTP Trainee (0) $2,000 
Electric Ground Worker (0) $2,000 
Cashier (0) $2,000 
Senior Account Clerk (0) $2,000 
Utility Draftsperson (1) $2,000 
Accountant (2) $2,000 
WWTP operator (1) $6,000 
During that negotiating session, CSEA representative Comfort described the 
Village's per annum costs of the proposed increases, which were handwritten on 
ocatA s proposals was inienaea xo reierence ine Dase salary Tor eacn curreni 
employee. Further, she testified that CSEA proposed staggering the implementation of 
the increases to accommodate the Village's cost concerns. 
A separate spreadsheet utilized by Comfort to explain CSEA's proposals during 
the negotiating session listed the impact of the proposals in the first two years of the 
proposed agreement. In the last column of the spreadsheet, there were lump sum 
amounts listed for over a dozen specifically identified Village employees. For the first 
year, the spreadsheet calculated the base salaries for all current employees with a 
3.5% increase. The last column of the spreadsheet for that year lists the figures of 
$2,00.0 for the incumbent account clerk, $6,000.00 for each of the two current 
apprentice line workers and the assistant utility line supervisor and $5,000.00 for each 
of the two current line workers. The spreadsheet, however, does not include those 
figures in the calculation of the base salaries of the six employees. The spreadsheet 
concerning the second year lists lump sum amounts for ten additional current 
employees in a column labeled "Inc Starting Salaries." 
Village Mayor Wallace testified that during negotiations the parties never 
discussed current unit employees receiving lump sum increases or adjustments in 
addition to annual percentage increases to their salaries. According to Wallace, he 
thought that the per annum costs discussed by the parties during the May 29, 2009 
session were only the "cost[s] to increase the starting salaries of those positions by the 
proposed numbers." He denied discussing with Comfort the cost of salary adjustments 
for existing employees in the first year of the successor agreement or spreading such 
adjustments over the term of the agreement. Wallace admitted agreeing to CSEA's 
noiaiion Dy uomron ax me oonom OT OOEM S iviay za, ^uua proposal summary: Mgreea 
5/29/09." During his testimony, however, Wallace stated that he agreed to "a salary 
increase of three and a half percent, a health insurance contribution and starting salary 
by title increases." 
On June 1, 2009, Comfort sent an email to Wallace with two attachments: a 
proposed Schedule A concerning the starting salaries for each job title during the four-
year period, along with a proposed memorandum of agreement (MOA). In her email, 
Comfort stated, in part: 
As promised, I have written the [MOA]. Please look carefully 
at the compensation article. / have attempted to capture 
what we had earlier agreed upon regarding the apprentice 
lineworker's bump in salary in relationship to the "two years" 
of training and the bonus when NYS puts forth the exam. 
I have also attached the Schedule A for starting salaries by 
year. When I originally gave you last week the proposal, I 
forgot to add two titles that we currently do not have anyone 
in: WWTP Worker and Working Supervisor. Thus, I have 
increased their starting salaries in Year Four of the contract. 
I hope this is ok. (Emphasis added) 
Schedule A set forth proposed starting salaries for all titles staggered over the 
four years of the agreement consistent with the parties' agreement on May 29, 2009. 
The proposed MOA stated that it had to be ratified by both parties, and it 
included the following provisions in the compensation article: 
Article VI Compensation 
A. Schedule A (attached) sets forth the grades and starting salaries for all job 
titles . 
B. Wage increases during the term of the agreement are as follows: 
June 1, 2009 - May 31, 2010 3.5% wage increase 
samiy inuiGdse avuve uie o.o/o waye muiedse. MUUUUHI u/evK 
$2000; Apprentice Lineworker $6,000: Assistant Overhead Line 
Supervisor $6,000; and Lineworker $5,000. 
June 1, 2010 - May 31, 2011 4.0% wage increase 
Employees in the following titles will also receive an additional 
salary increase above the 4.0% wage increase: Utility Service 
Worker $2,000; Maintenance Person $2,000; Assistant Utility 
Maintenance Supervisor $6,000; and Automotive Mechanic $2,000. 
June 1, 2011 - May 31, 2012. 4.0% wage increase 
Employees in the following titles will also receive an additional 
salary increase above the 4.0% wage increase: Meter Reader 
$2,000; Service Desk Operator $2,000; Consumer Service Clerk 
$2,000; Assistant Utility Service Supervisor $6,000; and Senior 
Clerk $2,000. 
June 1, 2012 - May 31, 2013 4.0% wage increase 
Employees in the following titles will also receive an additional 
salary increase above the 4.0% wage increase: Clerk $2,000; 
Clerk PT$2,000; Laborer $2,000; WWTP Trainee $2,000; Cashier 
$2,000; Senior Account Clerk $2,000; Utility Draftsperson $2,000; 
Accountant $2,000; WWTP Operator $6,000; WWTP Worker 
$2,000; and Working Supervisor $5,000. 
F. When an Apprentice Lineworker has satisfactorily completed the "two years of 
training" (and this could actually take longer than two years) that is 
necessary in order to be eligible for the Civil Service Lineworker exam, 
he/she shall receive an increase in base salary of one-half (1/2) the 
difference between the starting salary of an Apprentice Lineworker and 
a Lineworker. Upon passing the Civil Service Lineworker exam, the 
Apprentice Lineworker shall receive an additional $1,000 on his/her 
base salary. (Emphasis in the original.) 
On June 4, 2009, Comfort sent Wallace a follow-up email suggesting a slight 
modification to the compensatory provision concerning the reference of a line worker 
civil service examination. Comfort also asked Wallace if he had reviewed the MOA and 
if he had any proposed changes. 
Wallace testified that he presented the terms of the MOA to the Village Board for 
ratifir.atinn nn . l imp 15 900Q althni inh hp han1 nnt vpt rprpivprl a harH-nnnv draft nf thp 
document num oomiori. uminy ins pmsmiiauuii, vvanaue uesuiueu me CHIMUCJI 
percentage increases, increases in starting salaries, health insurance changes and 
other provisions of the agreement. He did not explain to the Village Board that if the 
MOA was ratified certain employees would receive lump sum salary increases in 
addition to annual percentage increases. Following Wallace's presentation, the Village 
Board voted to ratify the proposed agreement. 
According to Wallace, he received the MOA for the first time on June 17, 2009, 
when the CSEA unit president delivered a hard copy to him at his office for signature. 
Although he signed it, he testified that he "didn't read it as carefully obviously as I 
should have, no." On June 19, 2009, Wallace sent an email to Comfort stating that he 
did not object to her request to modify the signed MOA to include reference to a civil 
service apprentice line worker exam instead of a civil service line worker examine as 
the condition precedent for increasing the base salary of an apprentice lineworker by 
$1,000. 
CSEA unit employees ratified the MOA on June 25, 2009. Comfort then 
prepared a successor agreement containing the identical compensation provisions to 
those set forth in the MOA. Upon receiving the draft successor agreement from 
Comfort, Wallace notified Comfort that the compensatory provisions were different from 
what he understood the parties had agreed to and that he had presented to the Village 
Board. He objected to the inclusion of lump sum increases for current employees 
because the parties had agreed to increasing starting salaries. As a result, Wallace 
refused to execute the agreement drafted by Comfort. 
After CSEA filed a grievance, the Village and CSEA agreed that the annual 
lump sum bdidiy duju&iiMfciiius IUI uune iu ei i i j j iuyees wuuiu ue itj&uivtiu u i iuuy i i uie 
grievance arbitration process. Subsequently, the percentage wage increase, health 
insurance contribution, and increase in clothing allowance were implemented. 
On September.9, 2009, the Village issued a statement to each employee with an 
itemization of the Village's position regarding the employee's wages and benefits that 
excluded the disputed lump sum payments. The Village directed each employee to 
sign and return the statement unless they disagreed with the Village's calculation. 
DISCUSSION 
It is a well-settled proposition under the Act that a party to a negotiated 
agreement that is clear on its face cannot reject that agreement based upon a claim 
that she or he misapprehended its terms.2 As a result, the refusal of a party to execute 
a written agreement, upon request, incorporating the agreement reached by the parties 
during negotiations constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of §209-
a.1(d) of the Act.3 However, when there is strong and compelling objective evidence in 
the record demonstrating that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties 
with respect to the terms of a signed tentative agreement, we will not find a violation of 
§§209-a.1 (d) or 209-a.2(b) of the Act when a party refuses to execute a collectively 
negotiated agreement containing the provisions of that tentative agreement4 
2
 Union Springs Cent Sen Teachers Assri, 6 PERB 1J3074 (1973); Sylvan-Verona Beach 
Common Sch Dist, 15 PERB jf3067 (1982), pet dismissed, Sylvan-Verona Beach 
Common Sch Dist v. New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 16 PERB 1J7004 (Sup Ct 
Oneida County 1983) a/Fd, 97 AD2d 959, 16 PERB 1J7029 (4th Dept 1983); PortJervis 
Teachers Assn, 19 PERB 1J3039 (1986). 
3
 Deer Park Teachers Assn, 13 PERB P048 (1980). 
basea upon me unique Tacis ana circumstances presented in mis record, ana 
the totality of the evidence, we conclude that Article VI(B) of the MOA did not embody 
the parties' agreement because CSEA and the Village did not have a meeting of the 
minds about supplementing the agreed-upon annual percentage increases with lump 
sum increases in the base salaries for all unit employees over the four years of the 
agreement. Although execution of an MOA is ordinarily presumptive proof of an 
agreement, the Village rebutted that presumption through the introduction of compelling 
objective evidence, which CSEA failed to controvert sufficiently. While CSEA and the 
Village clearly intended to increase the starting salaries for all unit positions, there was 
no agreement between them to grant equivalent lump sum salary adjustments to all unit 
employees in addition to an annual percentage increase. 
It is undisputed that the Village agreed to three elements that are clearly listed in 
CSEA's final May 29, 2009 proposals: percentage salary increases for all unit 
employees, starting salary increases for all unit positions and health insurance 
contributions. The dispute before us is whether there was a meeting of the minds 
between the parties concerning a fourth element, which was not expressly included in 
CSEA's final proposals: increasing the base salaries of all current unit employees by 
the same amount as the agreed-upon increases in starting salaries. 
The evidence in the record belies Comfort's claim that CSEA's final proposal to 
increase "starting salaries" was understood by both parties to include identical salary 
adjustments to the base salaries for all current employees. Her assertion is 
contradicted.by the terms of the May 29, 2009 proposals, and CSEA's prior written 
proposals, which distinguish between percentage salary increases and increases to 
email, oomion staiea max sne anempiea 10 capture ine parties agreed-upon salary 
adjustment for apprentice line workers who meet certain conditions, and the agreed-
upon starting salaries set forth in Schedule A. Notably absent from Comfort's email is a 
reference to a purported agreement between the parties for all current unit employees 
to receive a lump sum adjustment to their base salary. 
While Comfort asserts that the parties' understanding was reached during 
discussions prior to May 29, 2009, CSEA did not offer any documentary evidence 
demonstrating this purported mutual intent to merge the obvious distinction between 
increases to starting salaries and current salaries. In fact, the spreadsheet utilized by 
Comfort to explain CSEA's proposal during the last bargaining session described the 
listed lump sum increases in the last column as increases in starting salaries and those 
amounts were not included in her calculation of base salaries for the respective 
employees along with the annual percentage increase. Finally, Comfort did not explain 
during her testimony the inclusion in the MOA of additional separate lump sum 
increases in the "base salary" for apprentice line workers beyond the $6,000. 
Although the record clearly demonstrates that the parties reached a general 
agreement early in their negotiations that starting salaries for all titles should be . 
increased and that current employee salaries should be adjusted, if necessary, to 
ensure that they were not below any newly agreed-upon starting salaries, we find that 
the record does not support the conclusion that both parties intended that all current 
employees are to receive salary adjustments equivalent to the amount of the increase 
in starting salaries in addition to annual percentage increases. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the Village 
aranea ana seni oy u o t a aue 10 a iacK OT a meeiing OT me minas Dexween tne parries 
concerning the compensatory terms of the agreement.5 
We affirm, however, the ALJ's conclusion that the Village violated §§209-a.1(a) 
and (d) of the Act by sending wage statements to the individual unit employees and 
directing them to sign and return such statements. Those statements concerned 
matters in dispute between the Village and CSEA, and addressing such issues directly 
with unit employees who are not on CSEA's negotiating team violates §§209-a.1(a) and 
(d) of the Act. 
As to the Village's failure to provide agreed-upon longevity payment, we find that 
this was an inadvertent error, as it was contrary to the Wallace's instructions. Assuming 
that this oversight has been corrected, we do not address it in our remedial order. If the 
Village has not furnished the longevity payments to unit employees, we would be 
disposed to grant a CSEA motion to reopen this matter for the purpose of addressing 
that issue. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby dismissed to the • 
extent it alleges that the Village violated §209-a..1 (d) of the Act by failing to execute the 
successor agreement proffered by CSEA. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Village: 
1. rescind the directive to unit employees to sign and return the statement of 
wages issued to each employee on or about September 4, 2009; 
2. immediately destroy any such wage statements returned to the Village by 
) 
5
 In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the exception targeting the ALJ's finding 
that the Village's conduct waived the right of the Village Board to ratify a successor 
unn employees, ana 
sign and post the notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
September 20, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
i 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Village of Bath in the unit represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) that the Village of Bath will: 
1. rescind the directive to unit employees to sign and return the statement 
of wages issued to each employee on or about September 4, 2009; and 
2. immediately destroy any such wage statements returned to the Village by 
unit employees. 
Dated By 
on behalf of Village of Bath 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-17811 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (RACING AND 
WAGERING BOARD), 
Respondent. 
LISA M. KING, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (LYNN 
HOMES VANCE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the State of New York 
(Racing and Wagering Board) (State) and exceptions by the Public Employees 
Federation (PEF) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) concluding that the State 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employee's Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally announced a 25 percent reduction in the per diem rates of pay for 
seasonal track employees at State horse tracks who are in the PEF-represented 
negotiating unit.1 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
PEF's charge was originally conditionally dismissed, and deferred to the 
-parties' contractual grievance procedure.2 Following arbitration of a related PEF 
contract class action grievance, the arbitrator issued a decision and award 
concluding that PEF did not have a contractual source of right concerning the per 
diem rate reduction under the compensation provisions in Article 7 of the parties' 
1995-1999 collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) or the parties' 
memorandum of interpretation concerning seasonal employees (Side Letter) in 
the PEF-represented unit.3 Specifically, the arbitrator concluded that the at-
issue employees in the PEF-represented unit were properly designated as 
seasonal and were, therefore, not covered by Article 7 of the 1995-1999 
agreement. In addition, the arbitrator ruled: 
Given the appropriateness of the Grieyants' 
designation, it is clear that the State did not violate the 
Side Letter when it reduced by 25 percent the per 
diem rates for the positions they held in January 
1996. Nothing in the Side Letter prevented the State 
from doing so. As such, there is simply no language 
therein which could be interpreted so as to support 
the Union's claim. Thus, this is not a case where in 
1
 State of New York (Racing and Wagering Bd), 43 PERB 1J4503 (2010). PEF 
has filed exceptions limited to the Assistant Director's proposed remedy. 
2
 State of New York (Racing and Wagering Bd), 29 PERB 1J4582 (1996). 
3
 Exhibit 4 attached to Joint Exhibit 1, 
the face of ambiguous language, the equities would 
justify sustaining the grievance. Instead, this is a 
case where despite the seeming unfairness of the 
State's action, there is no contractual basis by which 
that action can be reversed. 
In response to PEF's express concern about the future implications of the 
State's action if the class action grievance was not sustained, the arbitrator 
stated: 
I note also the Union's claim that by virtue of this 
decision, the State could reduce per diems the day. 
after a negotiated raise went into effect so as to vitiate 
the impact of any such increase. Frankly, such an 
action would be troublesome not merely because it 
would be "callous," but because it would raise issues 
of Union animus and abrogation of the Taylor Law 
duty to bargain in good faith. However, no such 
evidence exists in the instant dispute. Instead, insofar 
as this record reveals, the decision to reduce per 
. diems by 25 percent was made without regard to 
negotiated increases that were due to take effect a 
number of months thereafter or that had taken effect 
1
 previously. Consequently, the hypothetical situation 
posed by the Union might well constitute a violation of 
law and or the Agreement, while the State's action in . 
this case did not, I find. (Footnote omitted) 
The arbitrator concluded his decision with the following: 
In-sum, I conclude that no provision in the Agreement 
or in any other statute, rule, etc. cited by the parties 
precluded the State from reducing per diems of the 
affected employees by 25 percent in January 1996. 
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the 
grievance must be denied. It is so ordered. 
Thereafter, PEF moved to reopen the charge, which was opposed by the 
State. In the alternative, the State sought an order granting preclusive effect to 
the arbitrator's decision and award with respect to certain issues. 
In a letter decision, the ALJ reopened the charge and granted preclusive 
effect to four findings of fact made by the arbitrator: a) the at-issue PEF unit 
members are designated as seasonal employees as that class is ordinarily 
defined; b) as .seasonal employees, they are governed by the Side Letter, which 
is appended to the parties' agreement; c) the State did not violate the Side Letter 
when the per diem rates for at the at-issue positions were reduced by 25% in 
January 1996; and d) no provision in the agreement or in any other statute, rule 
or regulations cited by the parties precluded the State from reducing per diem 
rates of the affected employees by 25% in January 1996. 
After the charge was reopened, processing was delayed at the request of 
the parties. The parties engaged in extensive efforts to narrow the disputed 
factual issues, which resulted in a stipulation of facts and a Joint Exhibit that 
includes dozens of exhibits. Thereafter, a hearing was held before the Assistant 
Director concerning disputed issues related to the status of the at-issue seasonal 
employees and their per diem rates of pay. Following issuance of the Assistant 
Director's decision, both parties sought and were granted extensions by the 
Board for the filing of their respective exceptions and responses. 
FACTS 
PEF is the duly certified collective bargaining representative of;State 
employees in the Professional, Scientific and Technical Unit including the at-issue 
track personnel who hold seasonal positions. Article 7 of the of the 1995-1999 
agreement states that the "State and PEF shall prepare, secure introduction and 
recommend passage by the Legislature of such legislation as may be appropriate 
and necessary to provide the benefits" set forth in that article. 
Seasonal track personnel are in the exempt class of the classified civil 
service, and they serve at the pleasure of the Racing and Wagering Board 
Chairperson (Chairperson). They are employed during a specific track meet, and 
then must be re-appointed by the Chairperson to work another track meet. 
The Side Letter between the parties included a numbered paragraph 
outlining compensation terms for unit employees in seasonal positions. 
Subparagraph A provided for lump sum payments in fiscal years 1996-97 and 
1997-98 for seasonal employees paid on an hourly, per diem or annual basis, 
who met defined eligibility requirements. Subparagraph B included salary 
increases for seasonal positions in fiscal years 1997-98 and 1998-99. 
The Side Letter's compensation paragraph also contained the following 
subparagraph placing explicit limitations on the^discretionary authority of the 
State Director of the Budget (State Budget Director) to adjust the rates of 
compensation for seasonal employees in the PEF-represented unit: 
C. Effect of Minimum Wage Level 
If during the term of this Agreement the rate of 
compensation of any employee in a seasonal 
position is increased at the discretion of the 
Director of the Budget for the purpose of making 
such rate equal to the Federal minimum wage 
level, the provisions of [Subparagraphs A and B 
above shall be applied to such seasonal employee 
in the following manner: 
1. The seasonal employee's rate of 
compensation shall remain at the adjusted 
rate established by the Director of the 
Budget from the effective date established 
by the Director of the Budget until the date 
of the next general salary increase provided 
for in [Subparagraphs A or B. 
2. Effective on the effective date of the next 
general salary increase provided for in 
[Subparagraphs A or B such employee's 
rate of compensation shall be either the 
adjusted rate established by the Director of 
the Budget, or his/her rate prior to the • 
adjustment, increased by the percentage 
provided for in the applicable paragraph, 
whichever is higher. (Emphasis added) 
Finally, the Side Letter states that the compensatory provisions and the 
provision concerning the State Budget Director's adjustment to the rate of 
compensation are applicable to those seasonal employees paid on a per diem 
basis: 
D. Hourly and Per Diem 
All of the above provisions shall apply on a pro rata 
basis to seasonal employees paid on an hourly or per 
diem basis or on any basis other than at an annual 
rate, or to seasonal employees paid on a part-time 
basis. The above provisions shall not apply to 
seasonal employees paid on a fee schedule. 
The at-issue seasonal track positions have never been allocated to a 
statutory salary grade, although the Department of Civil Service's Director of 
Classification and Compensation Division has the statutory authority to do so.4 
All positions not allocated to a statutory salary grade are administratively 
4
 See, Civ Ser Law §118.1(b); Transcript, pp. 122-123, 126. 
designated as non-statutory or "NS." The Department of Civil Service defines 
"NS" as an "administrative designation for salaries established by the Division, of 
the Budget pursuant to Section 44 of the State Finance Law for positions not 
allocated to a statutory salary grade."5 Wages for NS positions are not set by 
statute and are subject to. a distinct procedure under State Finance Law §§44 
and 49. 
Prior to each year's meet, the Chairperson submits a request to the 
Division of the Budget for approval of the number of seasonal employees to work 
the meet and the suggested rates of pay. If approved, the Division of the Budget 
issues a certificate of approval along with a schedule of positions setting forth the 
approved salary rates for that meet. According to the testimony of the State 
Division of the Budget's Chief Budget Examiner and the Department of Civil 
Service's Director of Classification and Compensation Division, seasonal 
positions expire at the end of each racing season, and staffing levels and 
deployment vary from season to season. 
Following a review of operations at the Racing and Wagering Board in the 
fall of 1995, the State Budget Director utilized his statutory discretion and 
approved a 25 percent reduction in the per diem rates for seasonal track 
personnel commencing with the January 1996 meet, as a means of cutting 
agency costs. Following the action of the State Budget Director, on January 2, 
5
 New York State Department of Civil Service, Glossary of Terms available at 
http://www.cs.ny.gov/pio/merit-guide/glossary.cfm/ 
1996, the Chairperson issued a memorandum announcing the per diem 
reduction from the previous year's rates for seasonal appointments effective 
January 1, 1996. The reduction applied to all seasonal personnel in the PEF-
represented unit working for that agency. It is not disputed that the salary 
reduction was unrelated to any changes in job duties or qualifications. 
DISCUSSION 
Among its many exceptions, the State contests the Assistant Director's 
rejection of its waiver defense, which is premised upon the terms of the Side 
Letter for seasonal employees and the provisions of the legislation implementing 
the negotiated benefits in the parties' 1995-1999 agreement as well as legislation 
implementing their prior agreements. 
In County of Nassau (Police Department),6 we clarified the proper labeling 
of a defense to a charge alleging a unilateralchange in violation §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act based upon the fact the subject of the change has already been 
negotiated to completion by the parties. As part of that clarification, we 
distinguished between a wavier defense and a duty satisfaction defense: 
Waiver concepts suggest that a charging party has 
surrendered something. Although waiver may 
accurately describe a loss of right, such as one 
relinquished by silence, inaction, or certain other 
types of conduct the defense as described is not one 
under which a respondent is claiming that the 
charging party has suffered or should be made to 
suffer a loss of right. Under this particular defense, a 
6
 31 PERB U3064(1998). 
respondent is claiming affirmatively that it and the 
charging party have already negotiated the subject(s) 
at issue and have reached an agreement as to how 
the subject(s) is to be treated, at least for the duration 
of the parties'agreement. By expressing this 
particular defense as duty satisfaction, we give a 
better recognition to the factual circumstances 
actually giving rise to it and expect to avoid the 
confusion and imprecision in analysis which have 
sometimes been caused by the other noted 
characterizations of this defense.7 (Footnote omitted) 
In the present case, the State's waiver defense is based primarily upon 
the Side Letter, and that defense is comprised of two components. The State 
claims that PEF waived its' right to negotiate and also claims that the State 
satisfied its duty to negotiate the subject of the charge. While the State's 
defense conflates the distinction we have carefully drawn between a waiver 
defense and a duty satisfaction defense, we find merit to the State's argument 
that it satisfied its duty to negotiate under the Act. 
In order to demonstrate its duty satisfaction defense, the State must 
present "record evidence of facts establishing that the parties negotiated an 
agreement upon terms which are reasonably clear on the subject presented to us 
for decision."8 A determination concerning whether the parties negotiated the at-
issue subject to completion, requires an interpretation of the Side Letter through 
r 
our application of standard principles of contract interpretation. We will consider 
7
 Supra, note 6, 31 PERB at 3142. 
8
 NYCJA, 41. PERB 1J3014 at 3076 (2008). 
extrinsic evidence only if the Side Letter is reasonably clear but susceptible to 
more than one interpretation.9 
We conclude that the negotiated terms of the Side Letter contains 
limitations on the statutory authority and power of the State Budget Director to 
approve the unilateral adjustment of compensatory rates for seasonal 
employees, and it defines how that discretion will be applied concerning certain 
unilateral adjustments. While the Side Letter did not explicitly address the State 
Budget Director's authorizing a decrease in the per diem rates for seasonal 
employees at the commencement of each meet, the Side Letter is reasonably 
clear that both parties intended the Side Letter to act as a negotiated limitation 
upon the State Budget Director's discretion with respect to unilateral adjustments 
in the rates of compensation for seasonal positions in the unit. 
In interpreting the Side Letter, we have considered the legal authority of 
the State Budget Director and.the Department of Civil Service under applicable 
state law. The Department of Civil Service's Director of Classification and 
Compensation Division has the discretion to treat the at-issue per diem track 
positions as "NS" positions by not allocating those positions to a salary grade, 
which means that the applicable wage level for those positions are subject to the 
procedures of State Finance Law §§44 and 49. Consistent with State Finance 
Law §§44.1 and 49, the State Budget Director has the discretion to approve or 
disapprove adjustments to the salary for those NS positions prior to the 
9
 Shelter Island Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB 1J3032 (2012). 
commencement of each racing season. The terms of the Side Letter reveal 
recognition by the parties of the State Budget Director's discretionary authority to 
approve unilateral rate adjustments for per diem employees in the PEF-
represented unit and that the application of such discretion is subject to 
negotiations under the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the State did not violate §209-
a.1(d) of the Act because it satisfied its duty to negotiate with PEF concerning the 
State Budget Director's discretion to make unilateral rate adjustments for per 
diem track employees in the PEF-represented unit Therefore, it is unnecessary 
for us to address the State's other exceptions or the exceptions filed by PEF. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the charge herein is dismissed. 
DATED: September 20, 2012 
Albany, New York . 
7 7 Jerome Le/kowitz/yhairperson 
^ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
